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Abstract
We present an argument for changes in the franchise in which an elite split along
economic interests use the suﬀrage to inﬂuence implemented policies. Through the
inﬂuence of these policies on the character of industrialization, we analyze the eﬀects of
franchise changes on economic growth. We identify in the social structure of society an
explanation for the connection between enfranchisement and growth: When (1) there
exist an economic conﬂict among the elite, (2) landed classes are not politically strong,
and (3) there exists a critical mass of industrial workers, we observe both growth and
democratization. The lack of conditions (1) or (2) resolves in stagnant autocracies
while the absence of condition (3) drives growth-deterring democratic expansions. We
provide historical support for our argument by analyzing the experience of 11 countries.
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1 Introduction
The nineteenth century was a time of rapid economic growth and development. Over
this period, the seeds sown by the industrial revolution were realized by expansions in
technology and markets. As important as changes in the structure of industry and markets,
the nineteenth century was also a period of signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations in the structure and
allocation of political rights. Many countries saw large-scale changes in the distribution of
political voice, changes leading not only to increases in the electorate, but also to massive
decreases.
The concurrence of changes in the “engines of economic growth” and this “ﬁrst wave”
of changes in the franchise is not coincidence.1 When one considers a pre-industrial or early
industrialized society comprised of diﬀerent social groups, one can imagine preferences over
the character of economic growth to diﬀer across (and potentially within) each group. As
such, the enfranchisement or disenfranchisement of these groups is a means for political
parties to pursue economic policies beneﬁtting their constituencies.
In this paper we present a theory of franchise changes in which an elite split along
economic interests use the suﬀrage to inﬂuence implemented policies and hence, growth.
Speciﬁcally, we take economic policies to asymmetrically aﬀect diﬀerent economic sectors,
raising productivity in only the skilled sector which drives economic growth (in our model,
industry). These policies can be construed as any government intervention promoting
industrialization, like the reduction of tariﬀs, the creation/promotion of national markets,
investment in infrastructure, education or health care. Given the asymmetric sectoral
beneﬁts of these policies, political parties representing the diﬀerent economic interests of
elites may shape political institutions (and in particular the electorate) in order to control
1The argument that the industrial revolution triggered the process of democratization can be traced back
to the work of Toynbee (1884).
1policies, thereby inﬂuencing the realization of potential growth opportunities. Thus our
theory develops our understanding of the interrelation between the franchise and economic
growth, highlighting the pivotal roles played by governments in promoting the industrial
revolution (Adelman, 1999).
A key element for our argument is that political parties represent the diﬀerent interests
of an elite divided on an economic cleavage. This cleavage has been traditionally identiﬁed
with the rural-urban cleavage, but its historical realizations took many diﬀerent forms. For
example, in Switzerland Liberals favored the promotion of commerce and a uniﬁed market,
while Conservatives defended a decentralized confederation that maintained their cantonal
‘monopolies’. In Canada the conﬂict concentrated on the terms of trade with the U.S. In
Sweden, it was not until the end of the century that the split of the dominant Agrarian
Party on free-trade/protectionism made suﬀrage the most important issue.
Given the conﬂicting interests among the elite, parties look in the disenfranchised groups
for the necessary political support to implement their preferred policies. In our model, it
is precisely this type of alignment or misalignment of policy preferences between groups
among the elite and workers which provides an explanation for extensions and restrictions
of the franchise. For example,
when he [Chancellor Otto Furst von Bismark] promoted universal suﬀrage in
the North German Confederation (and later the German Empire)... [he] implic-
itly expected that peasants, who were largely loyal to the king, would also be
obedient to their manor lords and employers when voting (Colomer, 2001).
Our theory yields several insights into the tandem relation between economic growth
and democratization. Following the opening quotation, “economies controlled by feudal
landed interests could only achieve narrow-based growth without development and pre-
sented no extensions of the franchise (Adelman, 1999). On the other hand, in early stages
of industrial development liberals typically promoted extending the franchise to workers
against the opposition of conservatives. This permitted governments to pursue active in-
dustrial and market policies, thereby sustaining higher levels of economic growth. However,
2these extensions were limited: Once enough workers had been enfranchised, the policies fa-
vored by liberals were secured and further expansions were opposed. For example, Danish
Liberal Prime Minister J.C. Christensen froze any electoral change when suspected his
party would not beneﬁt (Elklit, 2002). Moreover, if conservatives expected an alignment
of interests between landlords and peasants, conservatives opted for universal suﬀrage.
This eﬀectively quashed economic policies favoring industrialization, stalling the process
of economic growth. For example, in 1874 Chilean conservatives pushed for extending the
franchise into poorer agriculturalists considered supportive of conservative policies (Valen-
zuela, 1996). This ushered in a period of policies favoring agricultural and mineral exports
and the virtual neglect of urban and industrial infrastructure.
Our theory also casts democratic expansion as a “trickle down” process: Policy-driven
industrial development raises industrial productivity and industrial wages. Given the pres-
ence of wealth and income requirements during the nineteenth century, these policies raised
the incomes of workers and eﬀectively enfranchised them over time.2 Therefore, provided a
democratic institution exists, growth of technology and wages naturally leads to a diﬀusion
of voting rights. Following Persson and Tabellini (1994), while democracy may be harmful
for economic growth, economic growth is good for democracy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related liter-
ature, delineating the ways our approach improves the understanding of franchise reforms
above existing theories. The economic and political models are described in section 3. The
next two sections contain our main results: Section 4 presents our argument for changes in
the franchise and section 5 analyzes the connections between patterns of enfranchisement
and economic growth. Section 6 analyzes the historical experiences of eleven countries and
ﬁnds support for our theory. While our focus is on the changes in the franchise imple-
mented during the nineteenth century, the argument can be applied to more recent changes
in voting laws.3 Section 7 concludes.
2For example, rising wages in Sweden resulted in an increase in the electorate over the period 1872–1908:
without legislative changes, the percentage of enfranchised males increased from 22% to 33% in rural areas
and from 21% to 45% in urban areas (Heckscher, 1963).
3For example, the “motor voter” legislation in the U.S. reduced many of the costs of voting, particularly
32 Related Literature
Our research builds on the growing literature exploring the process of democratization.
Much of this literature builds on the de Toquevillian paradox implicit in the work of Persson
and Tabellini (1994): If greater democracy (extension of the franchise) implies a poorer
median voter, and hence higher levels of redistribution, why would elites choose to extend
voting rights?
In response to this paradox, much attention has been paid to the processes of democ-
ratization arising from threats “from below:” elites may extend the franchise in order to
quell revolutionary threats from the disenfranchised. In the work of Acemoglu and Robin-
son (2000, 2001), elites opt for universal suﬀrage in order to make a credible commitment
to redistribution and eliminate the threat of revolution.4 In a similar vein, Conley and
Temimi (2001) argue that investments in “threat technologies” increase the likelihood that
a disenfranchised group is allocated voting rights.
Unlike our analysis, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) assume a homogenous elite and a
government restricted to pure redistribution. Thus, the only motivations for electoral reform
come from disenfranchised groups. Those groups must therefore be suﬃciently organized
to pose a credible threat (recall Conley and Temimi, 2001). This is why many of their
historical references fall in the early twentieth century after the organization of the working
class, while our argument presents a better ﬁt with the nineteenth century experiences of
political reform. See section 6 for details.5
In a spirit similar to ours, Lizzeri and Persico (2004) argue that elites may wish to extend
the franchise in order to steer politicians away from causes serving narrow constituencies
those facing poorer Americans. It is therefore not surprising that this legislation was supported by Democrats
(who expected to gain supporters) and derided by Republicans (who expected their share of supporters
among the electorate to fall).
4Lee (2003) focuses on the relation between democracy and redistributive bias by elites: while democ-
ratization reduces predation by elites (the “Olson eﬀect”) it implies a poorer median voter and greater
redistribution (the “de Tocqueville eﬀect”).
5Observe that our argument falls far from the political competition theories criticized by Acemoglu and
Robinson (2000). These theories envision power-motivated politician who extend the franchise expecting
votes in return; our argument is deeply rooted in the alignment of economic interests between a split elite and
disenfranchised groups. Therefore Acemoglu and Robinson’s evidence contradicting these theories (pages
1187-1189) is explained by our arguments, as we show in section six for UK, Germany, Sweden and France.
4and towards policies with more diﬀuse beneﬁts. Enfranchising of individuals beyond the
elite forces politicians to garner support through the provision of public goods beneﬁting
the whole electorate. The model’s implications are used to explain the increases in public
spending witnessed during Britain’s “Age of Reform.”6
While we and Lizzeri and Persico (2004) emphasize heterogeneous preferences among
the elite, our argument underscores the roles of political parties and the interests of the
social groups they represent. As a result, our model explains why diﬀerent political groups
favored diﬀerent levels of enfranchisement (e.g. Orleanists versus Legitimists in France, the
Liberal Movement versus Bismark in Germany).7 Further we tie these franchise levels to
the implementation of economic policies, thereby illuminating the conditions under which
the extent of the electorate can foster or forestall economic growth.
Finally we stress two ways in which our argument improves the understanding of fran-
chise reform above existing theories. First, our theory provides and explanation for two
historically repeated observations: (i) the rich history of franchise restrictions and (ii)
the tendency for conservative governments to support larger extensions than liberal gov-
ernments. For example, in France (1850) and Canada (1885) conservatives signiﬁcantly
restricted the franchise to an elite dominated by conservative voters. On the other hand,
in Chile (1874) and Germany (1871) conservative interests supported large extension of the
franchise in an eﬀort to swamp liberal interests. Secondly, our theory identiﬁes the nexus
between enfranchisement, economic policy and growth during the nineteenth century, a
time when it is widely acknowledged that governments played a critical role (Adelman,
1999; Morris and Adelman, 1988).
In line with these conclusions are Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2001), Sokoloﬀ and Engerman
6Other models of franchise extension include Bertocchi (2003, emphasizing the relation between primo-
geniture and the indivisibility of land in the diﬀusion of voting rights), Fleck and Hanssen (2002, emphasizing
the inconsistency of aristocrats desiring human capital investment among the lower classes and wishing to ex-
propriate these investment) and Llavador and Oxoby (2002, emphasizing the second-order eﬀects of changes
in the electorate on equilibrium policy proposals).
7With non-ideological political competition, swing voters should receive large transfers prior to the ex-
tension of the franchise. This conclusion is diﬃcult to reconcile with the view that the landed aristocracy
beneﬁted from the pre-extension political system (Parente and Zhao, 2002; Galor et al., 2002). By incorpo-
rating economic interests in the political arena, we ﬁnd a historically consistent result in which the landed
aristocracy controlled and beneﬁted from the political system prior to the extensions of the suﬀrage.
5(2000), and Sokoloﬀ (2002). Sokoloﬀ and Engerman (2000) argue that, although South
America had greater factor endowments than North America, the relative inequality of
political rights limited its potential for growth in the New World. South American countries
were dominated by landed interests who, as in our model, had little incentives to invest in
public goods which increased workers skills (e.g. education). Thus, in line with Acemoglu
and Robinson (2000), Benabou (2000) and Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993),
An extension of political power beyond an elite to a broad spectrum of the
population might, for example, be expected to lead to greater investment in in-
frastructure and other public goods and services conducive to growth... a wider
participation of the population in a commercial activity and economic matters
generally, and perhaps more competition throughout the economy. (Engerman
and Sokoloﬀ, 2001, p.2)
However, elites were reluctant to extend political power, using, for example, poll taxes
to exclude immigrants and non-Europeans from exercising voting rights. Similarly, after
independence, Spanish colonies shifted from wealth to literacy requirements in order enfran-
chise criollo supporters and disenfranchise non-favorable groups (i.e. Native Americans).
Generally speaking, countries with greater equality and homogeneity among the population
observed faster and deeper extensions of the franchise, an argument also present in Colomer
(2001). This equality and homogeneity result in fewer diﬀerences in policy preferences, fa-
cilitating extension of the franchise.
As with the previous papers, in which democratization and deeper extensions of the
franchise helped speed economic growth, Justman and Gradstein (1999) argue that the
extensions of the franchise exhibited in nineteenth century Britain were triggered by the
Industrial Revolution (cf. Toynbee, 1884). These changes in the franchise were both the
outcome of and a channel through which income inequality was reduced. As evidence, Just-
man and Gradstein (1999) cite the increases in public expenditures dedicated to productive
investments which, consistent with our model’s predictions, occurred after extension of the
6franchise.8
3 The Model
We assume a society populated by a continuum of agents belonging to one of three classes:
landlords (l), capitalists (c) and workers (w), with the latter endogenously split between
the skilled (s) and unskilled (u) sectors of the economy. The set of classes is given by
J = {l,c,w}, each with mass ηj ∈ (0,1) and ηl + ηc + ηw = 1 and the mass of workers
divided between ηs + ηu = ηw. Within each class, agents are diﬀerentiated by their initial
endowments θ (wealth or innate skill). We use classes to represent diﬀerences in access to
production technologies.
Landowners and Capitalists: Landowners and capitalists are endowed with non-wage
incomes θj ∈ [θj, ¯ θj], with continuous distribution Fj, j ∈ {l,c}. We assume that landown-
ers and capitalists constitute the elite in that they control the agricultural and the industrial
sectors of the economy.
We interpret the agricultural sector as the unskilled sector, represented by the produc-
tion technology gl(Ll) = ML1−α
l , where α ∈ (0,1), Ll is the amount of labor employed
in agriculture, and the technological parameter M is determined exogenously. In the in-
dustrial (skilled) sector of the economy capitalists are able to exploit the skills of workers
in accord with the production technology gc(Lc) = NL
1−β
c , where β ∈ (0,1), Lc is the
eﬃciency units of labor employed in industry, and N is a technological parameter.
Given a pair of competitively determined wages, an agricultural wage wl and an indus-
trial wage per eﬃciency unit of labor wc, landowners and capitalists maximize proﬁts by
choice of Ll and Lc. Letting πl and πc be the associated proﬁt functions, the income of a
member of the elite is given by θj +πj(wj) with j = l for landlords and j = c for capitalists.
8Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) claim that political participation increases as the result of the decision
by elites to subsidize the education of the poor under the auspices of spurring economic growth. This timing
of events (investment in public goods engendering democratic reform) diﬀers from our timing (democratic
reforms engendering investment in public goods). More akin to our timing of events is that discussed in
Fleck and Hanssen (2002): Without voting rights, individuals do not invest in human capital from fear of
expropriation by elites.
7Workers: As opposed to landowners and capitalists, workers have no access to technology
nor possess non-wage income. Rather, each worker is endowed with a skill level θw ∈ [θw, ¯ θw]
with continuous distribution Fw. Workers inelastically supply a single unit of labor in either
the skilled or unskilled sector. If an agent chooses to work in agriculture, she receives the
wage wl. However, in the industrial sector, an agent exerts θw eﬃciency units of labor and
receives income θwwc.
We assume that workers can costlessly migrate between sectors. Hence, the supply of
labor in each sector will depend on relative wages. In particular, workers with skills θw ≥
wl
wc
choose to work in the industrial sector, while those with skills θw <
wl
wc supply labor to the













The Labor Market: Workers are hired by landowners and capitalists in a competitive
labor market and wages w∗
l and w∗
c are uniquely determined by market clearing conditions.9
Fact 1 There exists a unique pair of wages w∗
l and w∗
c that clear the agricultural and





such that, in equilibrium, ηu = Fw(θ∗) ηw > 0 and ηs = ηw − ηu > 0.
Proof: Given the nature of the production functions gl and gc, it is clear that if (w∗
l ,w∗
c)


















ηl = ηwFw(θ∗), (2)
where left hand sides represent labor demand and right hand sides represent labor supply.
9It is widely accepted that, even during the 19th century, “industry and agriculture competed for labor,
even though labor was by no means scarce.” (Magnac and Postel-Vinay, 1997)
8Letting µ(θ∗) =
R ¯ θw















The left hand side of equation (3) is strictly positive, continuous and monotone increasing in
θ∗. The right hand side is continuous and monotone decreasing in θ∗, approaching inﬁnity
as θ∗ → θw and equal to zero when θ∗ = ¯ θw. Therefore, there exists a unique θ∗ ∈ [θw, ¯ θw]
solving (3). It follows that w∗
l and w∗






















We assume that technological development occurs through economic policies asymmetri-
cally aﬀecting agents. Speciﬁcally, these policies increase productivity in the industrial
sector without beneﬁt to the agricultural sector. These policies encompass the develop-
ment of market and legal institutions, infrastructure, education, health care, and basic
research and development. In a broad sense, this set of policies should be understood as
any government intervention promoting industrialization.10
Formally, we characterize these policies by the cost of their implementation, whether
this cost arises through an increase in public expenditure (e.g. public investment in in-
frastructure) or a reduction in government revenue (e.g. through the reduction of tariﬀs).
The productivity eﬀect of these policies is captured through the technological parameter
N(τ) where τ ∈ [0,1] is the tax rate (levied on income) reﬂecting the cost of these poli-
cies. We assume N(0) = N0 > 0 to be the current technology, N0 ≡ ∂N/∂τ > 0 and
10See Adelman (1999) and Morris and Adelman (1988) for the crucial importance of governments in
advancing industrialization and the many ways industrialization was promoted.
9N00 ≡ ∂2N/∂τ2 < 0 with limτ→0 N0(τ) = ∞. Further, we assume economic policies to be
the only source of endogenous technological change and no depreciation.
Given the competitive labor market, growth enhancing policies (i) raise the marginal
product of labor and (ii) spur worker migration into the industrial sector. While (i) in-
creases and (ii) decreases industrial wages, the net eﬀect of technological improvement is
an increase in industrial and agricultural wages and in capitalists’ proﬁts.
Fact 2 Technological improvements (increases in N) yield (i) a migration of workers from
agriculture into industry, (ii) an increase in industrial and agricultural wages, and (iii) an
increase in capitalists’ proﬁts.
Proof:
(i) We can rewrite equation (3) as













(1−α)M > 0 and K(θ∗) =
µ(θ∗)β







Therefore θ∗ is a decreasing function of N.
(ii) That w∗
l is monotone increasing in N follows from the previous point and equation (5).
Finally, since θ∗ is decreasing in N and w∗
l is increasing in N, w∗




(iii) Recall that πc(wc) = NLc(wc)
1−β − wcLc(wc). The equilibrium industrial wage w∗
c is











10where we have made use of the ﬁrst-order condition of proﬁt maximization. Using the





















Diﬀerentiating equation (4) to obtain ∂w∗













From the previous points,
∂w∗
c
∂N > 0 and ∂θ∗
∂N < 0 (equation 7), while, by deﬁnition, µ0 < 0.






c < 1 < 1
1−β, and hence capitalists’ proﬁts are increasing in N. ￿
First, landowners will oppose any positive policy as it reduces their income without any
oﬀsetting beneﬁt. On the other hand, capitalists beneﬁt from the policy (Fact 2). We can
write disposable income of a capitalist endowed with θc as yc(τ) = (1−τ)(θc +πc(τ)).11 It
follows that a capitalist’s preferred policy τc satisﬁes




Since all capitalists have identical production technologies, they all receive the same increase
in proﬁts and hence wealthier capitalists prefer lower taxes.
Fact 3 Landowners preferred policy is τl = 0. Capitalists have single-peaked preferences
over tax rates. Moreover, the ideal policy of a capitalist τc is a decreasing function of θc.
Proof: That landowners prefer a zero tax is evident.
Let τc(θc) be the ideal policy of a capitalist with non-wage income θc. Since all capitalists
receive the same proﬁts and pay taxes proportional to their total income, τc is decreasing











l (and hence proﬁts and incomes) in terms of τ.







(1 − τ) ∂2πc
∂τ2 − 2 ∂πc
∂τ
(12)
Finally, we only need to show that yc(τ) = (1 − τ)(θc + πc(τ)) is strictly quasi-concave,
namely
∂2yc
∂τ2 ≡ (1 − τ) ∂2πc
∂τ2 − 2 ∂πc
∂τ < 0 whenever
∂yc
∂τ = 0. But if
∂yc
∂τ = 0, the ﬁrst order
condition is satisﬁed and (11) applies, proving that
∂2yc
∂τ2 < 0. ￿
Industrial workers also prefer τ > 0 since the marginal productivity of labor in industry
goes to inﬁnity as τ goes to zero and
∂w∗
c
∂τ > 0 (Fact 2). Letting ys(τ) = (1 − τ)w∗
c(τ)θw
represent industrial workers’ disposable income, all industrial workers share the same pref-
erences over policies.
Finally, let yu(τ) = (1 − τ)w∗
l (τ) represent agricultural workers’ disposable income.
Unlike industrial workers, agricultural workers only beneﬁt indirectly from the policy via
the labor market clearing conditions. Therefore they may prefer a zero or a positive tax
depending on whether the increase in their wage oﬀsets the cost. Regardless, the preferred
policy of agricultural workers will always be lower than that of industrial workers.12
Fact 4 Industrial workers share the same preferences over policies and favor a strictly
positive policy. Agricultural workers share the same preferences over policies and always
prefer a lower policy than industrial workers.
Proof: Since skilled workers’ disposable income is linear in θw, they all share the same
preferences over policies. Further, we know that limτ→0 N0(τ) = ∞. It follows then from
(3) and (4) that ∂w∗
c/∂τ → ∞ as τ → 0. Therefore, y0
s(τ) ≡ (1 − τ)
∂w∗
c
∂τ (τ) − w∗
c(τ) also
goes to ∞ as τ goes to 0, and skilled workers always prefer a strictly positive policy.
For agricultural workers, recall that w∗
l ≡ θw∗




θw . Since θ∗(τ) is decreasing in τ (Fact 2), agricultural workers always prefer lower
policy values than industrial workers. Finally, since agricultural workers receive the same
wage, they share the same preferences over policies. ￿
12As it will become evident, we do not need to show that workers have single-peaked preferences.
123.2 Political Equilibrium
We assume a simple model of two party competition in which parties A and C represent
classes within the elite. Party A, the agrarian or conservative party, represents landowners
and maximizes the income of its median constituent:
UA(τ) = (1 − τ)(θM
l + πl(τ)), (13)
where Fl(θM
l ) = 1
2 represents the median landlord. Since all landowners prefer τ = 0, the
preferred policy of the agrarian party is τA = 0.
Representing capitalists, party C maximizes the income of the median capitalist:
UC(τ) = (1 − τ)(θM
c + πc(τ)), (14)
where Fc(θM
c ) = 1
2. Let τC ≡ τc(θM
c ) > 0 be the preferred policy of the liberal party.13
We assume the simplest form of political competition in which there is no uncertainty
regarding electoral outcomes nor the behavior of the parties if elected. Thus, given an
electorate comprised of landlords, capitalists and workers, parties put forth the preferred
policy of the median voter (τM) and each party wins the election with probability one half.
Given this form of competition there is no direct beneﬁt from policy proposals since the
median voter’s preferred policy will be implemented (regardless of who is elected). However,
there is a beneﬁt of incumbency in that the party in power has the potential to change the
franchise. Changes in the franchise alter the median voter, and hence, ceteris paribus, the
welfare of each party in the subsequent election.
13Observe that some capitalists (the “poorest” ones) may prefer a higher policy than industrial workers.
For the ease of exposition, we do not deal with situations where the capitalist party seeks a higher policy than
industrial workers. This is equivalent to assuming a suﬃciently rich median capitalist, since a capitalist’s
ideal policy is decreasing in his non-wage income.
13Initial Conditions
Party J in power























Figure 1: Timing of events.
3.3 Franchise Rules
Following Meltzer and Richard (1981), we assume a model of limited franchise in which
classes have diﬀerentiated voting rights. Speciﬁcally, we assume that landowners and cap-
italists possess inalienable voting rights while the political participation of workers (who,
recall, have no initial wealth) is governed by a franchise rule ˆ y representing the minimum
level of gross income a worker must have to be eligible to vote.14 The franchise rule refers
to pre-electoral income, which is represented by income without (new) public investment.
We will refer to that segment of the population with voting rights (landowners, capitalists
and workers with income larger than ˆ y) as the electorate.
Changes in the extent of the franchise (via changes in the franchise rule) are enacted
by the incumbent party. Speciﬁcally, prior to an election, the party in power can imple-
ment a change in ˆ y deﬁning the electorate in the forthcoming election.15 The timing of
events is illustrated in Figure 1. The initial conditions are fully described by the exist-
ing technological level N0, a distribution of income y0 = {{yl,0(θl)}θl∈Θl; {yc,0(θc)}θc∈Θc;
{ys,0(θw)}θw∈[θ∗
0,¯ θw];yu,0}, and a governing party J ∈ {A,C}. The ruling party then chooses
ˆ y for the upcoming election. Once ˆ y is chosen, competition between parties yields, as de-
14An alternate approach would be to consider a franchise rule applying to all classes, not just workers.
Thus, all voters must have incomes above ˆ y to be eligible to vote. This does not alter the analysis, save
for introducing the potential for one class within the elite to disenfranchise the other. For example, if
landowners are wealthier than capitalists party A could consider a coup d’etat, disenfranchising capitalists
and implementing a zero tax rate.
15We choose to formalize franchise extensions as a discretionary instrument for the party in power. As
Lizzeri and Persico (2004) note, historically “the extension of the franchise did not come about referen-
dum. Rather, franchise reform was implemented by legislatures elected under limited franchise” (p.19). In
our model, these legislatures are comprised of elected party members representing competing landed and
industrial interests.
14scribed in section 3.2, a policy τM. If the implemented policy τM > 0, there is technological
advancement in the industrial sector (N(τM) > N0), inducing a new distribution of income




Hence, industrial workers have higher incomes than agricultural workers and are the ﬁrst
to be incorporated into the electorate as voting restrictions are eased. Only when all indus-
trial workers are enfranchised will further reductions in ˆ y extend the suﬀrage to agricultural
workers.
4 The Franchise
In this section we present our argument for changes in the franchise. We show that, de-
pending on the circumstances, both parties may have incentives to extend the franchise.
4.1 A Benchmark Case
Suppose suﬀrage rights are restricted to the elite. That is, for an existing level of tech-
nology and distribution of income, the franchise rule is such that no worker can satisfy its
requirement (ˆ y0 ≥ w∗
c,0 ¯ θw). Assuming the franchise rule ˆ y0 cannot be changed, we have
the following:
Proposition 1 Suppose the franchise rule ˆ y0 initially excludes all workers from voting and
is kept ﬁxed over time. Then,
(i) If ηl ≥ ηc, the implemented tax rate will be 0 in every period.
(ii) If ηl < ηc, a positive tax will be implemented. Furthermore, the set of enfranchised
workers will (weakly) increase over time.
Proof: If ηl ≥ ηc, τM = 0. If ηl < ηc, τM > 0 and w∗
l and w∗
c will increase over time
(Fact 2). If ˆ y0 does not change, some workers will eventually meet the franchise rule and
obtain voting rights. Since there is no depreciation, wages will never fall and the set of
enfranchised workers will (weakly) increase over time. ￿
15This result yields two insights on the relationship between enfranchisement and growth.
First, it emphasizes the importance of electoral and political institutions in achieving eco-
nomic growth. In the absence of enfranchised workers, whether landlords or capitalists
constitute a majority determines the character of economic growth (as discussed by Adel-
man, 1999). Secondly, given a majority of capitalists among the elite and a ﬁxed franchise
rule, workers will eventually be enfranchised. Thus, in some sense enfranchisement can be
though of as a natural process of development. That is, given that a democratic institution
exists, economic growth is good for democracy in that growth raises incomes and the ability
of workers to satisfy the franchise rule in a process of “trickle-down” democracy (Justman
and Gradstein, 1999).
Although τM > 0 when ηc > ηl, party C cannot implement its ideal policy until
industrial workers become suﬃciently wealthy and satisfy the franchise rule. Speciﬁcally,
until a mass of skilled workers equal to ηl are enfranchised, τM < τC. Thus, one may
infer that capitalists are the ﬁrst to favor extension of the franchise. However, as discussed
below, our model has the potential to explain not only extensions favored by capitalists,
but also those favored by agrarians.
4.2 Altering the Franchise Rule
We now focus on the evolution of the franchise via an incumbent’s use of the franchise rule
to maximize its welfare. Observe that in the absence of uncertainty about the implemented
policy, parties have no incentives to implement a franchise rule diﬀerent from their optimal,
since they cannot alter their probability of winning. Had a party decided not to choose its
optimal franchise rule in an election, it would reduce its current welfare without improving
its situation in upcoming elections. As a result, we need only concern ourselves with the
one period decisions of parties.
Extensions of the Franchise by Conservative Governments: Consider the case of an
incumbent agrarian party. Following proposition 1, party A can implement its ideal policy
16(τA = 0) if ηl > ηc. Thus, an incumbent agrarian party will restrict the franchise to the
elite in order to implement its preferred policy in the next election.16 However, our model
can also explain those instances –like Germany under Bismarck or many Nordic countries–
in which universal suﬀrage was favored by conservative political interests.
Assuming ηc > ηl, let τM
e > 0 be the preferred policy of the median member of the
elite, and hence the policy implemented in the absence of enfranchised workers. Recall that
unskilled agricultural workers prefer lower policies than industrial workers (Fact 4) and,
as they are the poorest of all workers, are the last to be enfranchised under a franchise
rule ˆ y. Thus, if agricultural workers support policies lower than τM
e and if there are more
agricultural workers than industrial workers, party A will endorse universal suﬀrage.17
Proposition 2 Party A will either restrict the franchise to the elite (ˆ y > w∗
c,0¯ θw) or pro-
mote full suﬀrage (ˆ y ≤ w∗
l,0). However, party A will never support partial extensions of the
franchise.
Thus, there exist situations in which an incumbent party A will implement universal
suﬀrage. Observe that agricultural workers can oﬀset the enfranchisement of industrial
workers (and thereby move the position of median voter to a citizen with a lower preferred
policy) only if ηu > ηs or Fw(θ∗) > 1
2. Since ∂θ∗/∂N < 0, we may observe conservatives sup-
port for universal suﬀrage when industrial productivity is relatively low. Such an extension
does not derive from changes in social values (as in arguments regarding the enlightenment)
or revolutionary threat from the disenfranchised, but rather from the strategic use of the
electorate by party A to manipulate implemented policies.
Extensions of the Franchise by Liberal Governments: Recall that, since ηl > 0, party
C will be unable to implement its preferred policy when only the elite is enfranchised. Thus,
16For instance, the 1850 law in France enacted by the Conservatives reduced the electorate by 62%
(Collier, 1999, p.42). Other examples are represented by the 1887 anti-socialist law enacted by Bismark and
the unequal suﬀrage systems used in the 1890s by German states (Sheehan, 1978).
17Historically, the alignment of landlords’ and peasants’ voting behavior was not exclusively rooted in
economic interests. In some instances (e.g. Switzerland, Germany, France) conservatives expected support
from peasants based on religious values or support for the king. For the purpose of our analysis, this is
equivalent to assuming agricultural workers’ ideal policy is τA = 0.
17party C will enfranchise workers until the median capitalist becomes the median voter.
(Further extensions of the franchise would increase τM beyond τC.) This is equivalent to
extending the franchise up to the point where the enfranchised mass of workers oﬀsets the
mass of landlords. Further, if agricultural workers favor a zero or low policy, they will never
be enfranchised by party C. Thus, extensions implemented by party C will be limited in
that they will never support universal suﬀrage.
Proposition 3 Party C will always put forth a franchise rule implementing τM > 0 and,
if possible, τC. Moreover, party C will enfranchise workers only to the point that the median
capitalist becomes the median voter.
Proof: Since industrial workers prefer a policy greater than τC, lowering ˆ y to enfranchise
these workers will move τM to the right. When τM = τC, any further extensions the
franchise will be opposed by party C as they will move the implemented policy away from
its ideal policy. ￿
Therefore, the limit to franchise extensions promoted by liberal governments derives
from two facts. First, party C may be able to enfranchise just enough workers to oﬀset the
mass of landlords, thereby making the median voter the median capitalist and implementing
τC. Secondly, there may not be enough industrial workers to oﬀset landlords (i.e. ηl > ηs,0)
and agricultural workers may support low policies. In such a case (which would prevail
at early stages of industrial development) party C will limit its extensions to industrial
workers and continue to extend the franchise as workers migrate into industry (Fact 2).
(Recall that for a ﬁxed franchise rule, the fraction of enfranchised workers is growing as
skilled workers receive higher wages.)
Three main conclusions follow from the analysis of the evolution of the franchise un-
der conservative and liberal governments. First, franchise contractions are fostered by
conservative governments. Second, extensions of the franchise promoted by conservative
governments are larger than those promoted by liberal (capitalist) governments. Third,
capitalists’ support for extending the franchise has a limit: Once their place is secured (i.e.
18τC can be implemented), capitalists oppose further extensions of the franchise. We show in
Section 6 that these hypothesis conform with historical evidence.
5 Franchise, Growth, and Social Composition
We now turn our attention to the relationship between changes in the franchise and eco-
nomic growth. Of interest here is the relationship between the distribution of agent types
(i.e. the share of landlords, capitalists, skilled and unskilled workers) and the distribution
of political power (as characterized by the franchise rule) on implemented policies. Since
policies are growth enhancing, this implies an important tie between the extent of political
voice and economic growth.
5.1 The Eﬀect of Enfranchisement on Growth
Suppose that landowners always vote for their party.18 In economies in which the class of
landlords exceeds that of capitalists, all growth is exogenous in nature:
Proposition 4 If ηl > ηc, then ˆ y > w∗
c,0¯ θw and τM = 0.
Proof: Follows from proposition 2. ￿
Notice that in such an economy, the landed class will always win the election by restrict-
ing the franchise. Thus one might expect economies in which landed interests dominate to
experience no endogenous growth (i.e. growth driven by policies promoting industrializa-
tion) and static franchise levels. Analogously, we have the following:
Proposition 5 Consider an economy in which ηc > ηl. Positive tax rates will prevail
regardless of the incumbent party’s aﬃliation if ηc + ηs,0 > ηl + ηu,0.
Proof: Follows from propositions 2 and 3. ￿
18This is equivalent to landowners voting for the party putting forth their most preferred policy and for





c,0¯ θw ˆ y
Figure 2: The relation between τ (and therefore growth through the public good) and ˆ y
for an economy in an early stage of development. The dotted line represents the case of an
economy with peasants holding heterogeneous policy preferences.
This implies two characteristics of an electorate are necessary for policy driven growth.
First, the class of landlords must be suﬃciently small so as not to outweigh capitalists
and skilled workers (i.e. those always in favor of τ > 0).19 Secondly, either landlords
are unable to obtain the support of agricultural workers or there exists a suﬃcient level
of industrialization such that landed interests are unable to implement τ = 0. That is,
recalling that ηs,0 = (1 − Fw(θ∗





One can think of economies with a high θ∗ as being at an early stage of development (i.e.
N0 is low relative to M, and hence ηu,0 > ηs,0; recall equation 3). For such an economy,
there exists the potential for landlords to implement τ = 0 by embracing universal suﬀrage.
This enfranchises unskilled workers, choking oﬀ public investment and economic growth.
Given these insights, there exists a Kuznets-type relationship between the franchise and
economic growth for democracies. When only the elites are enfranchised (i.e. ˆ y > w∗
c,0¯ θ)
parties put forth relatively low tax policies. As the franchise rule is lowered, skilled workers
are extended voting rights. This raises the median voter’s preferred policy, leading to higher
19This is consistent with the observations of Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) who ﬁnd a politically weak
agrarian elite to be perfect predictor for the survival of democracy in the interwar period (table 4.1, p.84).
20levels of industrial promotion and growth. However, if the franchise is fully extended and
unskilled workers are given suﬀrage rights, the preferred policy of the median voter falls,
thereby reducing parties’ proposals. Figure 2 illustrates this relationship for an economy in
which ηc > ηl (a positive policy prevails when ˆ y > w∗
c,0¯ θw) and in which τM is lower under
universal suﬀrage than under a franchise restricted to the elite.20
5.2 Predictions
In this section we summarize the predictions of the model for the relationship between the
distribution of voting rights, economic growth, and the social composition of an economy
(i.e. the relative masses of landed interests and aristocracy, capitalists or bourgeoisie, and
industrial and agricultural workers). Taken together, propositions 4 and 5 characterize the
attributes of an economy which yields endogenous growth: the class of landlords cannot
be too large (proposition 4) and the economy must be at a stage of development such
that (paraphrasing proposition 5) there are a suﬃcient number of industrial workers. This
distinguishes three types of enfranchisement-growth relationships, embodied in the following
“predictions” or “types” of economies. (See ﬁgure 3 and section 6.)
I Economies without a signiﬁcant entrepreneurial group (capitalists) exhibit no fran-
chise extension and low or no growth. Type I economies correspond to agrarian or
pre-industrial societies where a majority of landowners among the elite (the aris-
tocracy) control the government and oppose any extension of the franchise. These
economies are at a steady-state with slow or no growth.
II Economies with a large number of capitalists but lacking a mass of industrial workers
exhibit universal suﬀrage but low growth. Type II economies are also at an early
stage of development, but the landed class promotes extensions of the franchise in-
corporating unskilled peasants in order to retain the control of the state. Liberals, on
20The sharp fall of the policy for y < w
∗
l,0 is particular to the speciﬁcations of the model. In particular,
heterogeneous policy preferences among the peasantry would smooth the fall, as shown by the dotted line






















Figure 3: Predictions of the Model: Location of a diﬀerent types of economies in the
franchise-growth space.
the other hand, favor a far more restricted franchise.21
III Economies with enough capitalists and a substantial group of industrial (or urban)
workers exhibit gradual franchise extension accompanied by high growth. Type III
economics typify “industrial” economies where liberals favor and conservatives oppose
franchise extension.
6 Historical Evidence
We analyze the nineteenth century experiences of eleven countries and ﬁnd support for our
theory. We focus our analysis on identifying the characteristics of electoral reform and their
eﬀects on economic policies and growth. Fundamental to our model, we seek to identify an
economic cleavage among the elite. It is this conﬂict among the elite which leads to partisan
strategizing with the franchise and aﬀects the nature of economic development. We also
show that a heterogeneity among the disenfranchised existed, driving parties to strategically
extend (fully or partially) or rescind voting rights. We concentrate on the period 1850 to
World War I, when electoral reforms occurred “at a very early stage of industrialization,
21During the ﬁrst extensions of the franchise, many liberals and socialists leaders expressed their fear of
giving the right to vote to the ignorant peasantry. The Socialist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon held that “universal
suﬀrage given to a people of so neglected an education as ours, far from being an instrument of progress, is
only the stumbling-block of liberty.” (Proudhon, 1923, as cited in Colomer (2001))
22prior to the emergence of class-conscious workers acting as a group” (Collier, 1999, p.33)
and precedes many of the historical episodes analyzed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000).
The patterns emerging from this analysis are noteworthy: Countries implementing early
limited extension of the franchise (in accord with propositions 3 and 5) were relatively
early industrializers, experiencing higher levels of technological development sooner –type
III economies: Britain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Countries dominated by landed interests
or in which the elite were not split on an economic cleavage –type I economies: Argentina
prior to 1912, Canada prior to 1898, Chile prior to 1874, France, Germany prior to 1867,
Italy, and Spain– experienced restrictions of the franchise and lower levels of technolog-
ical development during the nineteenth century (in accord with proposition 4). Finally,
countries in which conservatives pushed for universal suﬀrage at relatively early stages of
development –type II economies: Argentina after 1912, Chile after 1874, and Germany after
1867– saw little industrial promotion (consistent with proposition 5).
Continental Europe
Switzerland: The Swiss reform of 1848 combined the absence of revolutionary threats,
an elite split on a political-economic cleavage, and a limited extension of the franchise
implemented by Liberals. The free-trade stance of the newly elected Liberals and the rapid
development of the railways allowed Switzerland to engage in heavy export promotion,
transforming it from a pre-industrial economy prior to 1850 into one of Europe’s most
industrialized countries by the end of the century.
Prior to the Sonderbund War (1847), political debate in Switzerland centered around
religious and economic policies: Liberals favored a secular federal state promoting commerce
while Conservatives supported a decentralized confederation protecting their monopolistic
power in the cantons and the authority of the Catholic Church. Given that the beneﬁciaries
of the traditional restrictions also held political power, Liberals called for the extension of
suﬀrage rights (Gitermann, 1941, p.441). In response Conservatives turned to disfranchised
groups, mobilizing rural supporters by “appealing to anti-urban, fundamentalist religious
23sentiment in the countryside” (Collier, 1999, p.57).22
After their victory, Liberals enacted the 1848 constitution and a limited extension of
the franchise which, given the relative lack of urbanization, was less than that proposed by
Conservatives and raised the electorate to approximately 31% of the population (Collier,
1999, p.58). Under the new constitution, cantons were uniﬁed under a common currency,
a national postal system, standardized weights and measures, and the abolition of local
toll roads within Switzerland. Most importantly, the constitution established the Federal
Department of Trade and Customs and paved the passage of the railway law (1852) es-
tablishing private enterprise in railroads and facilitating trade with France and Germany
(Huges, 1975). Although data on economic variables is incomplete prior to 1900, it is widely
acknowledged that these reforms had a dramatic eﬀect on Switzerland’s economic character,
developing the country into an industrialized economy by the end of the century (Schiﬀ,
1971).23
France: The French case provides an example of a split elite with a dominant conservative
group. This resulted in many instances of franchise restrictions, stalling industrial devel-
opment and giving French economic progress a character of backwardness (O’Brien and
Keyder, 1978).
Prior to 1849, the conﬂicting elite was integrated by two conservative groups, the Or-
leanists (mainly upper bourgeoise of Paris, the ﬁnancial sector, and increasingly the rail-
roads) and the Legitimist (aristocracy favoring the Bourbon monarchy). The Restoration
regime attempted to base its rule narrowly on the nobility, and the 1830 suﬀrage restriction
eliminated all but the richest landowners from the electorate (proposition 2). Its subsequent
downfall allowed Orleanists to enact a limited extension (proposition 3) ensuring that “the
22In accord with proposition 2 Conservatives “did not oppose democracy; on the contrary, they sought
to extend it and mobilize their followers against the Liberals” (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992, p.86). Observe
that this behavior cannot be explained by models emphasizing revolutionary threats, e.g. Acemoglu and
Robinson (2000).
23For example, the reductions in the costs of trade, along with the virtual absence of patent laws, allowed
Swiss chemical producers in the 1850’s to implement British developed procedures for the manufacture of
aniline dyes. By 1899, the value of Swiss dye production (90% of which was exported) exceeded that of
both Britain and France. See Schiﬀ (1971).
24upper bourgeoisie, particularly those sectors based in Paris and in ﬁnance, and not the
artisans that did the street ﬁghting,” were the primary beneﬁciaries (Rueschemeyer et al.,
1992, p.88).24
In May 1849, the petty bourgeoisie and professionals organized and obtained victories
in 21 of 30 by-elections (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992, p.90). As a consequence, conservatives
enacted the 1850 reform, reducing the electorate by 2.8 million men and concentrating pol-
icy making in the hands of conservatives (Collier, 1999, p.42). This permitted legal changes
making English-style banking impossible, creating crises for ﬁnancing capital and eﬀectively
stalling the railways, the iron industry, commodity imports and contributing to France’s
heteroclite pattern of nineteenth century growth (O’Brien and Keyder, 1978). By eﬀec-
tively stopping industrial development, these changes also stalled rural emigration, further
slowing the transformation of agrarian institutions and the adoption of newer industrial
technologies.
Germany: The 1848 liberal revolution represented the ﬁrst extension of the franchise in
Germany. Liberals, a blend of educated and political elite, sought to remove the abuses
of the existing political system through a restricted extension of the franchise (Sheehan,
1978, p.69-70). Liberals were “deeply suspicious of the masses, considering lacking in inde-
pendence” and welcomed franchise restrictions that served as buﬀers between the political
elite and the people (Blackbourn, 1998, p.234).
The next major political reforms in Germany were enacted by conservative governments.
By 1860 economic development was having an unmistakable impact on Germany and data
on Prussian elections between 1858 and 1866 (and the scattered data available on other
states) show that liberals drew their strongest support from the economic elite in cities
(Sheehan, 1978, p.81). In response, Bismarck, the conservative prime minister of Prussia,
established universal suﬀrage in the Northern German Confederation (1867) and in the
24The reform enfranchised only 1 in 170 inhabitants. Interestingly, both parties opposed further extensions
beyond the 1830’s levels, with Orleanists supporting the existing restricted suﬀrage and Legitimists favoring
a return to a more restricted franchise. See also Magraw (1983, p.48-49,68).
25uniﬁed empire (1871) based on his political calculations to swamp liberalism.25
He [Bismarck] wanted a democratic suﬀrage because he was convinced that the
majority of the Germans would be committed upon to elect a cooperative parlia-
mentary elite. In order to ensure that this would happen, the chancellor wanted
to combine universal male suﬀrage with three other provisions ... designed to
produce what would remain Bismarck’s ideal representative body: a group of
propertied men, drawn from landed and business elite. (Sheehan, 1978, p.145)
In line with our analysis (proposition 2), a politically weak opposition, a small working-
class movement (which was not consolidated until 1875), and the expected support of the
rural population motivated Conservatives to introduce full (male) suﬀrage and preserve the
conservative order.26 This allowed Bismark to pursue economic changes favored by the
agricultural society in Prussia (Barkin, 1970), like reductions in tariﬀs (which expanded
German grain markets with little eﬀect on domestic prices) and legal changes encouraging
money wages rather than in-kind wages and sharecropping (thereby allowing landed interest
to lower the real incomes of agricultural workers who had gained from high grain prices).
Summarizing, “neither the unequal manhood suﬀrage of 1848 in Prussia nor the equal
suﬀrage of 1867 and 1871 in the Confederation and Reich respectively was the result of
–or, indeed, attended by– working-class pressure” (Collier, 1999, p.103). On the contrary,
while the 1848 liberal revolution established a restricted extension intended to remove the
abuses of the existing political system (Sheehan, 1978, p.69-70), the 1860s and 1870s saw
“the establishment of the principles of full suﬀrage as part of a conservative strategy from
above [over the heads of the liberal opposition and with the objective to swamp liberalism],
and it was not accompanied by other components of a democratic regime, speciﬁcally
parliamentary sovereignty, civil liberties, or, in Prussia, equality of the vote” (Collier, 1999,
25See Colomer (2001, p.60), and Collier (1999, p.102-103), among others. Liberals themselves accused
Bismark of “stirring up the poorer classes against the propertied middle class” (Blackbourn, 1998, p.255-56).
26Interestingly, when socialists started to take advantage of these electoral reforms, Bismarck responded
with the anti-socialist laws of 1878. Observe that it is after this period that Acemoglu and Robinson (2000)
ﬁnd evidence in support of their argument.
26p.104).
Anglo countries27
The United Kingdom: The case of Britain has received the most attention by political
scientists and economists. The main political reforms in nineteenth century Britain (1867
and 1884) are commonly viewed as directed towards incorporating the lower classes into the
electorate. These reforms demonstrated the strategic possibilities of seeking labor support,
and “once reform had been put on the agenda, the parties competed for the ability to shape
it, to cast it in a form to their beneﬁt” (Collier, 1999), with Liberals striving for limited
extensions and Conservatives favoring broader suﬀrage rights (Lee, 1944; Smith, 1967).
Three main implications follow from the analysis of Britain’s ‘Age of Reform’.28 First,
pre-reform governmental institutions were under the control of a subgroup within the elite.
Hence, political reforms and the accompanying economic policies favored commercial and
urban classes within the elite. Industrial and commercial factions saw in political reform a
way of ending a situation where their “policies were blocked in a Parliament that dispropor-
tionately represented the landed groups” (Collier, 1999, p.62). Second, progressive franchise
extensions were closely linked with rapid urbanization. Finally, the observed increases in
public spending were devoted mainly to infrastructure (not redistribution), thereby rais-
ing domestic industrial productivity and facilitating commerce. These ﬁndings are fully
consistent with our theory and, combined with high economic growth, show Britain as an
exemplar of a type III economy.
Canada: In Canada the evolution of the franchise involved piecemeal extensions and re-
ductions in which control over electoral rules served as a political tool for promoting the
27While many of the franchise changes in the United States are consistent with our model, it is diﬃcult
to disentangle various confounds in the U.S. experience. Speciﬁcally, many of the changes in the electorate
were implemented at the state level (often under federal electoral law) and are strongly inﬂuenced by
issues most germane to the states in which they were enacted. Changes in literacy and income rules
and the implementation of policies such as voluntary registration were under the control of state and local
governments and had profound eﬀects on the distribution of voting rights. Thus, given the potential tensions
between federal and state governments and the speciﬁcity of many state issues, we have chosen to abstract
from the United States in the following analysis.
28We refer the reader to Lizzeri and Persico (2004) for details and references.
27economic policies of those in power. For example, migration and strong commercial ties
between Vancouver and San Francisco created a movement for amalgamation of British
Columbia with the United States. Fearing the loss of this rich resource base (and a domino
eﬀect against confederation in other Western provinces), Conservatives required voters be
born British citizens, thereby eliminating the votes of U.S. and immigrant settlers (Ry-
erson, 1968). The Conservative’s Electoral Franchise Act (1885) imposed similar voting
requirements eﬀectively restricting the franchise to agricultural elites and allowing a pro-
tectionist stance against the U.S. (Ryerson, 1968) Consistent with a type I economy, the
policies implemented under this restricted franchise slowed industrial development and in-
come growth: over the period 1870 to 1896, “Canada did not have the internal driving
force to provide its own dynamics. Without this capital inﬂow, there would undoubtedly
not have been as much growth” (Green and Urquhart, 1994, p.172).
Consistent with liberal interests favoring limiting expansion, much of the Act was re-
versed (1898) when Liberals implemented a limited extension and returned electoral rules
to provincial control. This extension permitted policies reducing trade barriers, providing
incentives for greater investment (which reduced transport and handling costs), and en-
couraging western settlement. These changes facilitated the “wheat boom,” ushering in a
period of export-led growth (Green and Urquhart, 1994).
Nordic Countries
Denmark: There is no evidence in the Danish case of a government forced to oﬀer expan-
sions of the suﬀrage against its will. On the contrary, in the electoral issue parties were
driven by self-interest: “their main objective was to ensure for themselves as much par-
liamentary (and of course bicameral) bargaining power as possible, since that would allow
them to pursue policy objectives more eﬃciently” (Elklit, 2002, p.36).
During the nineteenth century, the bourgeoisie and a rural middle class coalition (“in-
dependent owners of moderately sized farms” who had become “small capitalist traders”
opposing the great proprietors; Hovde, 1943) pushed for democratization, although Con-
28servatives (with the support of the king) maintained power without any major reform of
the political system. During this period, the basic rural/urban cleavage was the dominant
social and cultural divide, clearly reﬂected in a simple Conservative-Liberal party system
(Elklit, 2002, p.36).
When Liberals obtained power in 1901, the Social Democratic party (appealing to the
growing working class) was consolidated. Hence, in accordance with the best interest of its
constituency, the Liberal party froze any electoral change which would have enfranchised
supporters of this group. Once more, a Liberal party in power stalls further extensions of
the franchise when it does not expect to receive the votes of the new potential voters.29
Sweden: In Sweden democracy arrived via a series of gradual franchise extensions. The
Swedish reform of 1866 “represented the fulﬁllment of the program of [the] early nineteenth-
century bourgeois Liberals” conﬁgured by non-noble ironworks owners, wholesalers, non-
noble landed proprietors, and prosperous farmers (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992, p.93; our
italics). This reform replaced the estate system with a new two chamber system and, while
only a moderate extension, the reform had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the character of Swedish
economic growth, giving it the earmarks of a type III economy.30 For example, the 1866
reform permitted the removal of legislation restricting output to support domestic prices,
fostered industrial development by providing incentives for technology adoption, liberalized
imports, and opened the door for the electriﬁcation in industrial production (Heckscher,
1963). As a result, by 1880 Swedish iron production exceeded that of both France and
Germany (Schiﬀ, 1971).
Suﬀrage does not again become an issue until the last decades of the 19th century,
when a debate over free trade split the Agrarian Party into a new Conservative Party
29See Elklit (2002, p.30-36) for a description of the strategy followed by the Liberal Prime Minister (J.C.
Christensen) to “avoid any decisions that would eventually inﬂict losses on him and his party”.
30The First Chamber represented the wealthy and socially prestigious, and was the preserve of the right.
The Second Chamber was dominated by the Agrarian Party, primarily based on farmers who represented
small landed proprietors and constituted the engine for growth. Note that, according to their economic
interests, the Swedish Agrarian Party does not identify with the Conservative but with the Liberal party
in our model. This points becomes clear by the end of the 19th century when the Swedish Agrarian Party
split on the protectionism/free-trade cleavage, conﬁguring a Conservative-Liberal party system.
29(formed from “most of the Agrarian Party and a parliamentary faction of the right”) and
a Liberal Party (a “broad-based political force with its roots in the free-trade tendency”).
Not surprisingly, following the split, “the suﬀrage issue [promoted by the liberals and fought
by conservatives] constitutes the ideologically most potent dividing line between left and
right” (S¨ arlvik, 2002, p.234). Thus it is in the split of the elite along trade policy where we
ﬁnd the origin of the franchise issue.
Latin Europe: Italy and Spain
The patterns of enfranchisement and growth exhibited by Italy and Spain (i.e. those of a
type I economy) are consistent with our model given an elite dominated by landed interests
and therefore no impetus for franchise extension nor industrial development.
Politically, a common element to the Italian and Spanish experiences is the absence of
a split elite.31 This concurrence of elite interests resulted in the transformismo/el Turno
systems that eﬀectively ﬁxed electoral outcomes, stalling franchise expansions until the
years around World War I.32 Economically, this consolidation of political power resulted
in “an industrial revolution manqu´ e” (Harrison, 1978). In both countries, ruling interests
blocked the formation of internal markets and sought a highly protective state, as evi-
denced by tariﬀs in 1887 (Italy) and 1891 (Spain). These policies slowed the processes of
urbanization and industrialization, creating an environment in which the favoritism paid
to to entrenched interests alienated foreign investment and trade. Neither country could
eﬀectively shift labor from low productivity agricultural sectors into burgeoning industrial
sectors, thereby stalling economic growth (Clough, 1964; Nadal, 1987). For example, both
Italy and Spain lagged far behind other industrializing countries in the production of tex-
tiles and steel, patterns reﬂected in the countries’ growth of national income and level of
industrial development (Nadal, 1987; Schiﬀ, 1971).
31For instance, the Spanish land reforms of the 1850s opened the possibility of landowning for the aﬄuent
nobility, the upper peasantry, local political bosses, and the bourgeoisie, thereby merging their economic
and political interests (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992, p.119)
32In Italy, it was not until after World War I that mass electoral enfranchisement was implemented
(Colomer, 2001, p.56-57). In Spain, the military coup of 1923 ends the corruption of El Turno, instituting
a short-lived, but highly democratic, Republic.
30Latin America: Argentina and Chile
Sokoloﬀ and Engerman (2000) and Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2001) point out how strikingly
limited the franchise was in Latin American during the nineteenth century. The political
(and economic) power in these countries was concentrated in the hands of a landed aris-
tocracies; the lack of an active capitalist group made it impossible for the type of electoral
reforms which would have paved the way for active industrial policies.
Prior to the 1870’s, dominating landed interests imposed literacy and wealth require-
ments (along with informal policies subordinating the legislatures), thereby restricting the
electorates in Argentina and Chile (Collier, 1999; Colomer, 2004; Sokoloﬀ and Engerman,
2000). The absence of a viable capitalist class permitted landed interests to pursue poli-
cies which consolidated land-holding among the elite (Gerstein, 2000) and biased domestic
infrastructure (namely railroads) in favor of agricultural exports (Lingarde and Tylecote,
1999). The result was the virtual neglect of urban infrastructure, economic institutions
(e.g. a ﬁnancial sector providing capital to small industrialists), and industrial develop-
ment. As a result, both Argentina and Chile typify as type I economies throughout most
of the nineteenth century. Their classiﬁcation changes though for the last decades.
Through the 1880’s, Argentina saw signiﬁcant increases in foreign investment (includ-
ing 5,800 miles of British owned railroads), international trade (focused on agricultural
goods), and immigration (Rock, 1985, p.132). As a result, the elite was split between a
conservative landed elite (pressing for subsidies and trade credits) and a growing liberal
fraction espousing free trade and changes in foreign policy. This cleavage paved the way
for the 1912 electoral reforms: concordant with proposition 2, conservative leader S´ aenz
Pe˜ na enacted universal suﬀrage and compulsory voting, permitting the traditional elite to
maintain political and economic power, typifying a type II economy.
Similarly, in the Chilean reform of 1874 Conservatives endorsed a reform eliminating
voting restrictions (except literacy) and establishing impartial juntas with the oversight of
registration lists (Collier, 1999, p.60). In accord with proposition 2, conservatives pushed for
greater suﬀrage, enfranchising those considered supportive of conservative policies (Valen-
31zuela, 1996). As predicted, Chilean economic growth lagged behind other countries both
before and after the 1874 reforms: economic policies favored agricultural and mineral ex-
ports, investing little in urban services (Mamalakis, 1976). As with Argentina, conserva-
tives’ large extensions of the franchise and control over economic policies casts Chile as
a type II economy in which “the increments in productive infrastructure that might have
had a lasting eﬀect on the economy’s capacity to modernize and transform itself remained
small.” (Mamalakis, 1976, p.27)
7 Conclusion
Research on issues of growth and development are increasingly turning to the analysis
of the distribution of political power in delineating the ability of an economy to realize
its potential. As Sokoloﬀ and Engerman (2000) demonstrate, while factor endowments
play an important role in economics development, the full returns of these endowments
are rarely realized when the distribution of political power (and hence decision-making
rights over economic policy) is concentrated among the elite. Our analysis sheds light on
these ﬁndings. In particular, identifying the role of suﬀrage rights as a tool in partisan
competition helps explain how voting rights are allocated among the population. This
distribution of political voice in turn determines the way a government invests, expands
markets, and generally fuels the process of development.
We ﬁnd in the social structure of society an explanation for the connection between
enfranchisement and growth. When (1) there exist an economic conﬂict among the elite,
(2) the landed classes are not politically strong, and (3) there exists a critical mass of urban
(industrial) workers, we observe both growth and democratization. The lack of conditions
(1) or (2) resolves in stagnant autocracies while the absence of condition (3) drives growth-
deterring democratic expansions. It also follows from our analysis that we should observe
(i) franchise contractions are mostly fostered by conservative governments, (ii) franchise
extensions promoted by conservative (agrarian) governments tend to be larger than those
32promoted by liberal (capitalist) governments, and (iii) there exists a limit to capitalists’
support for extending the franchise. These observations are, in turn, largely supported by
historical evidence across a host of countries.
We conclude with two words of caution. First, we do recognize the role played by
the working class in the ﬁnal push of democratization. However, in most cases the working
class was not strong enough to start the process of democratization. As an indicator of this,
Therborn (1977) points out that in no case did the working class parties received electoral
majorities even after the introduction of universal suﬀrage. Hence, our argument aligns
with Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) when they note that “not only did the working class need
allies in other classes in this ﬁnal push, other classes were, in many cases, more important
in earlier extensions of the suﬀrage and/or struggles for parliamentary government” (p.83).
Secondly, our model does not adequately account for cases of high growth combined with
large extensions of the franchise. Such patterns have been observed in the late reforms
of some Northern European countries by changing political institutions from majority to
proportional representation. We leave this issue for future research.
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